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In this paper I investigate the optimal level of decentralization of tasks for the
provision of a local public good. I enrich the well-known trade-oﬀ between inter-
nalization of spillovers (that favors centralization) and accountability (that favors
decentralization) by considering that public goods are produced through multiple
tasks. This adds an additional institutional setting, partial decentralization, to the
classical choice between full decentralization and full centralization. The main re-
sults are that partial decentralization is optimal when both the variance of exogenous
shocks to electorate’s utility is large and the electorate expects high performance
from politicians. I also show that the optimal institutional setting depends on the
degree of substitutability/complementarity between tasks. In particular, I show that
a large degree of substitutability between tasks makes favoritism more likely, which
increases the desirability of partial decentralization as a safeguard against favoritism.
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11 Introduction
The provision of public goods entails diﬀerent tasks. For instance, the provision of basic
education involves, among other tasks, personnel management, organization of instruc-
tion, planning and resources allocation. When one looks at how these tasks are assigned
to diﬀerent levels of government across countries, it rarely follows a pattern where all
tasks are assigned to either the local government or the central government. Some coun-
tries like Turkey and Malaysia assign almost all tasks to the central government. Other
countries like Sweden and Hungary assign almost all tasks to schools. Most countries
assign tasks to diﬀerent tiers of government and the school (OECD, 1998).
What can explain the cross-country variation in assigning tasks to diﬀerent levels
of government? The paper provides an answer to this question based on the multitask
nature of the provision of public goods and the low-powered incentives that citizens may
provide to politicians through re-election. Assuming that local governments are more
accountable while the central government can internalize spillovers, I show that Partial
Decentralization (a government with two tiers) is optimal when the central government
under full centralization is likely to favor a region. The rationale is as follows: the
optimal level of decentralization depends on the risk born by politicians of being ﬁred
from oﬃce. When the risk is low, it is better to assign tasks to local governments. In this
case, ex-post citizens’ welfare is almost determined by politicians eﬀort, such that the
central government would be able to maximize chances of re-election with reduced eﬀort
(probably by coordinating policies across regions). When the risk is large, it is better
to assign tasks to the central government, since internalization of externalities increases
beneﬁts from eﬀort. However, if the risk is very large, the central government will have
incentives to favor a region (or regions) to keep the oﬃce. Partial Decentralization cuts
down these incentives. The cost of no favoritism is the creation of free-riding among
the levels of government. When the risk of no re-election is very large, the beneﬁt from
no favoritism is larger than the cost of free-riding. In addition, I show that when the
degree of substitutability of tasks is large, which makes politicians’ eﬀort more costly,
the desirability of Partial Decentralization increases as a safeguard against favoritism.
As in Seabright (1996) and a subsequent body of literature, the basic trade-oﬀ in
this paper is between accountability and internalization of spillovers. On the one hand,
local governments are more accountable than the central government in the sense that
citizens from a region may directly re-elect or oust their local politician. However, local
governments do not internalize spillovers. On the other hand, central government may
internalize externalities but is less accountable than the local governments. Seabright
(1996) shows that centralization has an eﬀect on accountability, the reduced pivot prob-
ability eﬀect: A loss of accountability due to the reduced probability that the voters
of a region have to determine the result of election. Thus, central government may be
re-elected even if some regions want to ﬁre it.
I formalize these ideas in a simple political agency model1 with multitask. In the
1See Besley (2005) or Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a comprehensive presentation of political agency
models.
2model citizens live in one of two regions. Two tasks are inputs for the provision of one
local public good. The public good provided in one region has positive spillovers on the
other. Tasks may be assigned to two levels of government: the central government and
the local governments. Eﬀort in tasks is costly to politicians but generates utility to
citizens. Not only does citizens’ utility depend on politicians’ eﬀort but it also depends
on a regional-speciﬁc shock.
Re-election is the mechanism available to citizens to provide incentives to politicians2.
With this mechanism citizens cannot sign complete contracts based on veriﬁable infor-
mation on politicians’ performance. Instead, citizens establish a utility threshold that
must be achieved in order for citizens to re-elect the incumbent politician. To capture
the reduced pivot probability eﬀect of centralization in the model, re-election rules are
deﬁned as follows: a local government is re-elected directly by citizens from the region.
Central government is re-elected when at least one region wants to re-elect it. It means
that the national politician may be re-elected even when one of the regions wants to ﬁre
it. This rule solves ties in favor of the incumbent politician and allows to capture the
reduced accountability of the central government with a model with two regions.
I compare the social welfare provided by three institutional settings. Either local
governments are in charge of both tasks in their own region (full decentralization), or
the central government carries out both tasks in both regions (full centralization), or
each tier of government carries out one task in each region (partial decentralization).
The question is: What circumstances (if any) make partial decentralization to provide
the largest welfare?
Since the central government is less accountable, it may favor one region. In single-
task models, favoritism increases the case for full decentralization. The main contribution
of this paper is to show that partial decentralization may do better for social welfare
than full decentralization when regional favoritism is likely.
More precisely, I deﬁne three strategies that the central government can follow. The
ﬁrst one, as usual, deﬁnes the symmetric solution. Since regions are equal ex-ante
, the central government may exert the same eﬀort in both regions. The other two
strategies deﬁne two types of regional favoritism. In the ﬁrst type, the central government
exerts eﬀort in a single region. This eﬀort is larger than the one in the symmetric
solution because the central government uses externalities to decrease chances of no
re-election. In the second type, the central government will coordinate eﬀort in both
regions, with the aim of being re-elected in the favored region. Besides the diﬀerence
in the equilibrium eﬀorts, these types of favoritism diﬀer in how the central government
assumes accountability. In the ﬁrst type the central government follows the rule of re-
election deﬁned above. In the second type, the central government takes advantage of
the reduced pivotal eﬀect to bet on being re-elected by a single region with no care about
the other region. In this simple model, it means that the central government behaves as
if it was the local government of the favored region. For this reason, I will call the ﬁrst
type of favoritism, weak favoritism and the second one, strong favoritism.
2This paper models what the literature on voting calls retrospective voting, that is, the idea that
voters assess incumbents actions while in oﬃce.
3In terms of the model, the risk of not being re-elected depends on the variance of
the exogenous shock that aﬀects citizens’ utility and the utility threshold used in re-
election. This threshold may be interpreted as an exogenous citizens’ expectation of the
politicians’ performance.
I show that partial decentralization does better than the other regimes, when both the
variance of exogenous shock and the utility threshold are large. In principle, it would
be better having a government that internalizes spillovers than having a government
more accountable. However, the best strategy for the central government under full
centralization is to strongly favor one region. With partial decentralization, each tier
of government ”specializes” in one task. Since local governments are more accountable
they exert positive eﬀort, which reduces the risk of no re-election (and the incentives
for strong favoritism) of the central government. The cost of no favoritism with partial
decentralization is that the central government free-rides on local governments’ eﬀort.
At the equilibrium, the central government exerts a lower eﬀort (due to free-riding) in
both regions. This result extends to the case in which the central government chooses
to weakly favor a region when citizens are risk averse to favoritism.
Furthermore, I investigate how task substitutability (complementarity) aﬀects the
previous results. This issue is at the core of the mainstream multitask problem with
complete contracts (Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991)). I introduce task substitution
in the cost function of politicians. Tasks are substitutes (complements) if an increase
of eﬀort in one task makes eﬀort in the other tasks more (less) costly. I show that
full centralization is better than full decentralization to deal with task substitutability.
However, increasing task substitution also make the central government more prone to
strong favoritism, which increases the case for partial decentralization.
The approach adopted in this paper steps on the seminal papers by Barro (1973)
and Ferejohn (1986). These authors propose a principal - agent relationship between
politicians and citizens, focusing on moral hazard problems in government. Seabright
(1996) uses the main features of Ferejohn’s model to analyze the appropriate level of
decentralization of a local policy variable. Besides the reduced pivot probability eﬀect,
the author stresses a rent-scale eﬀect of centralization that gathers the idea that central
government may have more beneﬁts from reelection than local governments. Hindriks
and Lockwood (2004) add an adverse selection problem in a ﬁscal decentralization model,
showing that decentralizing ﬁscal policy may increase the probability of ﬁring bad incum-
bents. This paper abstracts from adverse selection issues. Selection eﬀects of re-election
would provide interesting insights but a pure moral hazard setting illustrates the point
on partial decentralization and favoritism. My model departs from Seabright’s in the
issues arising from the multitask nature. In particular, multitask allows us to analyze a
two-tier institutional setting - partial decentralization. This regime is not possible with
Seabright’s nor Hindriks and Lockwood’s models.
To the best of my knowledge, there are two papers that integrate multitask to po-
litical agency models. Alesina and Tabellini (2004) use diﬀerences in incentives between
politicians and bureaucrats to derive normative conclusions on whether tasks should be
allocated to one or another. Padro i Miquel (2004) present a one-politician-one citizen
4model with multitask issues. They show that multitask has an adverse eﬀect on the
politician’s equilibrium eﬀort, in particular to implement interior solutions. This result
resembles my result on weak favoritism. However, in their case it is due to non-concavity
issues and in mine due to the reduced accountability of central government.
The paper also relates to other political economy models of ﬁscal decentralization.
Lockwood (2002) and Besley and Coate (2003) present models of legislatures in which
the central government is conceived as a central instance with regional delegates voting
over agendas of regional projects. Without assuming spending uniformity there still
is a trade-oﬀ between centralization and decentralization because centralization may be
ineﬃcient to select projects. These papers do not consider partial decentralization. More
closely related, ? shows that a two-tier legislature may alleviate the ineﬃciencies of the
central legislature even if there are no externalities provided that projects of national
interest come along with projects of local interest. Local legislatures may undertake
projects discarded by the national legislature that have regional beneﬁts.
In addition, Bordignon, Colombo, and Galmarini (2003) show that partial decentral-
ization may do better than both full decentralization and full centralization in presence
of lobbying. In their model two regional ﬁrms may lobby either to increase the provision
of a regional public good or to monopolize a regional market. Assigning the regulatory
policy (the number of ﬁrms in each market) to the central government and the provision
of the public good to the local governments may reduce the eﬀectiveness of lobbying for
the markets.
Finally, in the context of complete contracts, ? proposes a model of adverse selection
to analyze regional favoritism. The national politician has more information about the
citizens preferences of the largest region. Decentralization arises as a mechanism that
may alleviate the downward distortion of production in the minority region.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section outlines the model.
The third section presents a benchmark in which tasks are separable and there is no
favoritism. The following section introduces favoritism and shows how it aﬀects the
welfare provided by the institutional settings at study. It also discusses the case in
which citizens are risk averse. The ﬁfth section deals with the analysis of non separable
tasks. The last section concludes.
2 The Model
There are two regions i = 1,2. In each region, two tasks should be done to provide a
local public service. Three institutional settings are studied. With full decentralization
one politician in each region (the local governments) is in charge of the respective tasks
for his/her region. With full centralization one politician (the central government) is in
charge of all tasks. Finally, with partial decentralization there are three politicians: the
central government, who is in charge of one task in each region, and the local govern-
ments, who are in charge of the other task in their own regions.
In each region, citizens are identical and the social welfare depends on the local public
service delivered in both regions. Moreover, citizens’ welfare is also aﬀected by a regional
5shock, yi. Citizens’ welfare from region i is given by




where ε is positive and smaller than 1 (I assume positive externalities) and i,j = 1,2,
i  = j denote the regions. In line with Besley (2005), this assumption means that the
citizens do have a common interest in achieving some outcome, such as, increasing the
quality of public education, increasing the eﬃciency of public spending, improving public
health, etc. Moreover, the analysis presupposes the existence of a well-functioning legal
system3.
The public service in region i, xi, is provided carrying out tasks ai and bi. The tech-
nology is linear and is expressed by xi (ai,bi) = ai+bi. As it was mentioned above, tasks
a and b are delegated either both to the central government, both to local governments
or one to each level of government. Performing tasks is costly for politicians since they
















where a = (a1,a2) and b = (b1,b2).









+ kLaibi, for i = 1,2. (3)
Finally, when tasks are split (partial decentralization), each local government, in
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Notice that if kL = kC = kPD, the total cost borne by the politicians is the same
across the institutional forms when they exert equal eﬀorts. In this case, the total cost
of local governments under full decentralization (which is twice the cost in equation (3))
is equal to the cost borne by the central government under full centralization (equation
(2)), and equal to the total cost of politicians under partial decentralization (sum of
equations (4) and (5)). In other words, there are no economies of scale. Moreover,
notice that since cost is quadratic, the marginal cost is increasing with eﬀort.
3For instance, politicians cannot bribe or intimidate citizens and there are legal sanctions for using
oﬃces corruptly.
6I also assume that kL, kC and kPD belong to the interval (−1,1) so that equations
(2), (3), (4) and (5) are strictly convex. Following the multitask agency literature,
I will say that eﬀorts are substitutes when additional eﬀort on one task makes more
costly the eﬀort on the other task, i.e., task substitution increases the marginal cost of
eﬀort. Conversely, eﬀorts are complements when additional eﬀort in one task reduces the
marginal cost of eﬀort in the other task. Formally, eﬀorts are substitutes (complements)
when the cross-partial derivatives of Ci(.) and C(.) are positive (negative), that is, when
the coeﬃcients of eﬀort substitution, kL, kC and kPD are positive (negative).
Citizens provide incentives for politicians to exert eﬀort through re-election. When
the national politician is re-elected, earns W; otherwise, earns zero. When the local
politicians are re-elected they earn pW; otherwise, they earn zero. Coeﬃcient p is a
proportional coeﬃcient, p ∈ (0,1], that allows for the national politician to have a larger
beneﬁt from reelection than the local politicians. This is congruent with the intuition
that national politicians may have more power than local politicians.
Re-election rules are given. The local government from region i is re-elected if the
realized welfare4, Ui (xi,xj) + e yi, is higher than or equal to an exogenous level, T. The
exogenous level T can be interpreted as the welfare that is expected from a rival political
party or as a minimum level of welfare that citizens expect from politicians’ actions. For
the sake of simplicity, T is assumed to be the same in both regions and for both tiers of
government.
The central government is re-elected when one of the two regions obtains a realized
welfare higher than or equal to T. This re-election rule solves ties in favor of the in-
cumbent politician. Along with the assumption on the number of regions, it allows the
model to be tractable while keeping interesting features. In particular, this re-election
rule captures the idea that the central government is less accountable than the local
governments. With the central government the citizens in either region have a lower
probability to determine the outcome of the election. The literature has called this
eﬀect the reduced pivot probability eﬀect of centralization. The local governments are
more accountable than the central government, since citizens can ﬁre the local govern-
ment when the realized welfare is smaller than T. Instead, the re-election of the central
government depends also on the realized welfare in the other region. It can happen that
a region wants but cannot ﬁre the central government because the other region wants to
re-elect him.







. Let si be the event that region i is satisﬁed with its local government,
i.e., Ui (xi,xj) + yi ≥ T. Let S1 be the event that at least one region is satisﬁed with
the central government. The probabilities of the events si and S1 boil down to
pr(si) =
Y
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2 + T − U2 (x)
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Y 2
4e yi denotes a realization of yi.
7where subindexes 1, 2 in the last equation denote the regions.
The timing is as follows: The economy has a form of government; either full decen-
tralization, full centralization or partial decentralization. In stage one, government(s)
choose(s) a and b. Eﬀorts are not observable to citizens. Afterwards, the regional shocks,
yi, are realized. Realizations are not observable to citizens neither. In stage two, the
population welfare is realized and citizens choose whether to re-elect their governments.
Notice that citizens have a limited role in the game since they can just decide to
re-elect or ﬁre the incumbent politicians. I will characterize the equilibrium eﬀort of
politicians in each institutional setting, in order to compare the expected social welfare
generated.
3 Benchmark: Separable tasks and no favoritism
As usual in this type of games, I solve backwards. In Stage 2 citizens realize their welfare,
compare it with T and vote. If the actual welfare is larger than T for both regions,
citizens re-elect the incumbent politician(s) in all the institutional settings. If the actual
welfare is lower than T for both regions, citizens ﬁre the incumbent politician(s) in all
the institutional settings. If the actual welfare is lower than T for one region but higher
than T for the other, there are diﬀerences in the re-election outcomes across the forms
of government. With full decentralization the local government of the ’non satisﬁed’
region is ﬁred, while the local government of the ’satisﬁed’ region is re-elected. With full
centralization, the central government is re-elected. With partial decentralization, both
the local government of the ’satisﬁed’ region and the central government are re-elected.
But, the local government of the ’non satisﬁed’ region is ﬁred.
The benchmark is characterized by the assumption that kL = kC = kPD = 0, that
is, politician’s eﬀort in one task does not aﬀect the marginal cost of exerting eﬀort in the
other. Since I want to stress the eﬀect of regional favoritism on the optimal institutional
setting, the benchmark is also characterized by the no favoritism solution. As we will
see below the central government may implement three strategies in order to maximize
the chances of being re-elected. In the remaining of this section I present the politicians’
choices under the benchmark and compare the citizens’ welfare under the three forms of
government considered. The analysis of favoritism is left to the Section 4.
3.1 The behavior of politicians
In Stage 1, politicians choose eﬀort a and b in order to maximize their chances to be
re-elected. Under my assumptions, local governments exert eﬀort in the assigned tasks
whenever the expected gain from re-election is larger than zero. They exert no eﬀort,
otherwise. On the other hand, since the central government deals with policies in both
localities and its accountability is reduced, there are three strategies that the national
politician can follow. The ﬁrst strategy is to exert eﬀort in both regions, that is, the sym-
metric solution. The other two strategies are asymmetric and represent diﬀerent types
of regional favoritism. This section deals with the symmetric solution (the benchmark).
83.1.1 Full Centralization
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where a = (a1,a2), b = (b1,b2) and x = (x1,x2).




(2T + Y )W
2(Y 2 + 2W)
, for i = 1,2. (7)
Notice that the equilibrium eﬀorts do not depend on the externality coeﬃcient, ε,
since the central government manage to fully coordinate the tasks among regions. The
equilibrium eﬀorts depend on the exogenous welfare expectation, T, the variability of the
exogenous shocks, Y , and the beneﬁt from re-election W 5. An increase in T increases
the probability of the central government to be ﬁred and thus increases equilibrium eﬀort.
Both the beneﬁt of re-election and the variability of the shocks have two opposite eﬀects
due to the coordination of externalities. The total eﬀects are shown in the following
Lemma (Proof in the appendix),
Lemma 1 At the equilibrium, an increase in the beneﬁt of re-election, W, increases
eﬀort of the central government. An increase of the variability of the shocks, Y , increases
eﬀort if Y < −2T +
√
4T2 + 2W and reduces eﬀort if Y > −2T +
√
4T2 + 2W.
The ﬁrst result is the expected. The second result says that the regional shocks make
the incumbent politician to face a risk of not being re-elected. When the variance of yi
is small, the politician reacts to an increase in the variance by increasing eﬀort. In this
way he reduces the risk of not being re-elected. Somehow, when the shocks’ variability is
small, the central government can determine or control the ﬁnal result on social welfare.
On the other hand, when the variance is large, the increase in the probability of re-
election due to an additional unit of eﬀort is small and, thus, an increase of eﬀort
following an increase of the variance of yi is no longer optimal.




With full decentralization, the local government of each region i chooses ai and bi to
maximize






















, for i = 1,2. (9)
The beneﬁt from re-election increases the equilibrium eﬀorts. The variance of the
shock reduces the probability of being re-elected provided by an additional unit of eﬀort.
Thus, the equilibrium eﬀorts decrease when the variance of the regional shock increases.
Moreover, the local governments do not coordinate their policies. They are able to reduce
their own eﬀort by 1
1+ε due to the external eﬀects among regions.
3.1.3 Partial Decentralization
With partial decentralization, the local government of region i chooses ai to maximize











, for i = 1,2
(10)
and the central government chooses b to maximize
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10With partial decentralization each tier of government specializes in one task or policy.
Politicians may free-ride on each other. At the equilibrium local governments free-ride
on each other as they do under full decentralization. Besides, the central government
free-rides on the local governments’ eﬀorts. But, local governments cannot free-ride on
the central government. This is so because local governments are more accountable
than the central government. That is, with partial decentralization there is a vertical
externality between the central government and the local governments. The eﬀect of this
externality at the equilibrium is gathered by the negative term in equation (13), which
corresponds to the local governments’ eﬀort weighted by the probability for the central
government of being re-elected.
3.2 Institutional Comparison
As the previous section shows, politicians are subject to risk. They are able to deal with
this risk in diﬀerent ways across the institutional settings. Accountability and diﬀerent
externalities have an eﬀect on the ability of politicians to deal with this risk and to
generate welfare. In this section I establish some conditions on the size of the variability
of the shock that make politicians to exert more eﬀort in one or another institutional
setting.
I compare the institutional settings using the expected social welfare generated in
each of them. The social welfare is deﬁned as the average of the expected welfare in each
region, 1
2U1 + 1
2U2 + E[yi]. Since E[yi] = 0, the average welfare boils down to the ﬁrst
two terms of the previous expression.
3.2.1 Full Centralization Versus Full Decentralization
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2 are the social welfare of each region, when the central government
exerts eﬀorts given in equation (7).














2 indicate the social welfare of each region when the eﬀorts are those
given in equation (9).
The main trade-oﬀ is as follows: on the one hand, the central government may deal
with risk coordinating policies across regions. On the other hand, local governments are
more accountable. The following lemma shows the results (Proof in the Appendix),
Lemma 2 Let Y 1 ≡ W














11With no favoritism, full decentralization provides larger social welfare than full cen-
tralization with the following conditions:
1. If 1 + ε = 2p, when Y < Y 1
2. If 1 + ε > 2p, when Y < Y 2
3. If 1 + ε < 2p, when Y < Y 3 or Y > Y 3
Otherwise, full centralization provides larger social welfare.
Three cases should be considered when comparing full decentralization and full cen-
tralization. These cases are deﬁned according to the relative beneﬁts of assigning tasks
to local governments instead of to the central government. When 1 + ε > 2p (Case 2),
full decentralization is relatively ineﬃcient to generate welfare. The beneﬁts the local
governments receive from re-election are relatively low with respect to the proportional
diminution of eﬀorts due to external eﬀects. On the contrary, when 1 + ε < 2p (Case
3), the beneﬁts the local governments receive are relatively high with respect to the
negative eﬀect of externalities and, thus, full decentralization is relatively eﬃcient to
generate welfare. The case in which 1+ε = 2p (Case 1) is an intermediate case between
the previous cases.
In all the cases, the social welfare with full decentralization is higher than the social
welfare with full centralization when Y is lower a given threshold, that is, when the
economy is relatively stable. The rationale behind this result is the following: when Y is
very low the politicians are more able to determine the social welfare actually realized.
In these conditions, the central government is more able to reduce eﬀorts than the local
governments for two reasons: ﬁrst, the central government can coordinate eﬀorts across
regions, and second, it is less accountable than the local governments. Hence, when
the variance of regional shocks is small, it is better to assign both tasks to the more
accountable government.
In Case 3, the more favorable to local governments, full decentralization also provides
the largest welfare when the economy is very unstable. When Y is very large, the increase
in the probability to be re-elected due to an additional unit of eﬀort is very low for both
tiers of government. In this case, accountability outweighs externality coordination.




(1+ε)2 . Otherwise, real roots Y 3 and Y 3 do not exist and full
decentralization always provides larger welfare.
3.2.2 Full Centralization Versus Partial Decentralization
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2 indicate the social welfare of each locality when eﬀorts are those
in equations (12) and (13).
I summarize the results of comparing the expected social welfare given in equations
(14) and (16) in the following Lemma (Proof in the Appendix),
Lemma 3 With no favoritism, partial decentralization provides larger social welfare
than full centralization under conditions (1.-3.) deﬁned in Lemma 2. Otherwise, full
centralization provides larger social welfare.
Lemma 3 shows that Partial Decentralization brings similar advantages as those
provided by Full Decentralization when it is compared with full centralization. Recall
that with partial decentralization there is another trade-oﬀ between a vertical externality
and specialization. The central government can free-ride on the local governments’
eﬀorts (vertical externality) but the task assigned to the local governments is more
accountable (specialization). When the shock variability is smaller than the thresholds
deﬁned in Conditions 1.− 3. , the gains of specialization outweighs the losses of vertical
free-riding, such that total eﬀort is larger with Partial Decentralization than with Full
Centralization. When the local governments are eﬃcient to generate welfare (Case 3),
partial decentralization always dominates full centralization if the outside option is low
enough.
3.2.3 Partial Decentralization Versus Full Decentralization
Finally, the comparison of full decentralization with partial decentralization is summa-
rized in the following Lemma (Proof in the Appendix),
Lemma 4 With no favoritism, full decentralization provides larger social welfare than
partial decentralization under conditions (1.-3.) deﬁned in Lemma 2. Otherwise, partial
decentralization provides larger social welfare.
This Lemma shows that when Partial Decentralization is compared with Full De-
centralization, it resembles to Full Centralization. The argument behind is the same as
in the previous comparison but operates in the other way around. When the shocks’
variability is larger than the thresholds deﬁned in Conditions 1. − 3., the local govern-
ments’ eﬀort is low. With full decentralization it means that the welfare provided is low.
With Partial Decentralization it means that the vertical free-riding is small and that
the central government must provide larger eﬀort to be re-elected. Therefore, Partial
decentralization generates larger welfare. As in the ﬁrst comparison, when the beneﬁt
of re-election of local governments are relatively large in comparison with the horizontal
free-riding (Case 3), Partial Decentralization generates more welfare than Full Decen-
tralization only if T is large enough.
Proposition 1 summarizes the institutional comparison with no favoritism (Proof in
the Appendix),
13Proposition 1 With no favoritism,
1. If 1 + ε = 2p, full decentralization provides the largest welfare when Y < Y 1.
Otherwise, full centralization does.
2. If 1 + ε > 2p, full decentralization provides the largest welfare when
Y < Y 2. Otherwise, full centralization does.
3. If 1 + ε < 2p and T2 >
4pW(2p−(1+ε))
(1+ε)2 , full decentralization provides the largest
welfare when Y < Y 3 or Y > Y 3. Otherwise, full centralization does.
4. If 1 + ε < 2p and T2 <
4pW(2p−(1+ε))
(1+ε)2 , full decentralization always provides the
largest welfare.
where Y 1, Y 2, Y 3 and Y 3 as deﬁned in Lemma 2.
Partial decentralization never provides larger welfare than the other settings.
With no favoritism, partial decentralization is always dominated by one of the other
two systems. In the more favorable case to local governments (when 1 + ε < 2p) full




(1+ε)2 and, thus, the central government has more incentive
to exert eﬀort.
4 The Case of Favoritism
Since the central government is re-elected when a single region has a realized welfare
larger than T, favoring one region may bring a larger utility to the national politician.
Favoritism makes citizens to face a risk, the risk of the national politician to exert
less eﬀort in their region. Under my assumptions, regions are completely identical to
politicians and, thus, have equal chances to be favored. Besides, citizens are risk neutral
(See Equation (1)).
Since I am interested to investigate under which conditions Partial Decentralization
reports a larger welfare than the other institutional settings, the following analysis sticks
to the conditions established in Proposition 1. From there, if the shock variability Y
is smaller than the low-bar thresholds Y 1, Y 2 and Y 3, partial decentralization will be
dominated by full decentralization. This section focuses on what happens above those
thresholds. I am interested to look at how favoritism aﬀects the social welfare provided
by Full Centralization and under which conditions it makes Partial Decentralization to
provide a larger social welfare. In the rest of the section I deﬁne two types of favoritism
and show how favoritism aﬀects the welfare output of Full Centralization.
144.1 Weak Favoritism
Let me deﬁne weak favoritism as follows
Deﬁnition 1 (Weak favoritism) The central government weakly favors region i if
maximizes the program Wpr
￿
S1￿
− C(a,b) (Equation (6)) over ai and bi and exerts
no eﬀort in the other region (aj = bj = 0).
As in the previous section, the central government maximizes the probability of being
re-elected by at least one region. But now, the central government restricts the space of
election variables to the tasks or policies in one region. It exerts no eﬀort in the other
region. Both things together mean that the central government cares about the welfare
in the non favored region only through the externalities it receives. The equilibrium







2 (2T + Y )W
2((1 + ε)2Y 2 + 4εW)
(17)
Comparing the equilibrium eﬀorts with no favoritism and weak favoritism (equations
(7) and (17)), it can be seen that the eﬀort exerted in the favored region is larger than
the eﬀort exerted in each region with no favoritism.
With weak favoritism the welfare in the favored region and the non favored region




(1 + ε)(2T + Y )W
(1 + ε)




ε(1 + ε)(2T + Y )W
(1 + ε)
2 Y 2 + 4εW
. (18)
The expected welfare of the non favored region is equal to the welfare of the favored











(1 + ε)2(2T + Y )W
2((1 + ε)2Y 2 + 4εW)
(19)
The following Lemma shows the condition in which both the national politician
chooses to weakly favor one region and the social welfare from weak favoritism is larger
than the social welfare from no favoritism (Proof in the Appendix)
Lemma 5 Let e Y ≡
q
2(1−ε)2W
(1+ε)2 . Weak favoritism is better than no favoritism for both
the central government’s utility and the social welfare if Y < e Y .
Lemma 5 shows that when citizens are risk neutral, weak favoritism is good for
both the national politician and social welfare under the same conditions. It shows that
under Full Centralization, both the central government weakly favors a region and the
6With no loss of generality, the favored region is Region 1 and the non favored region is region 2. The
symmetric case gives the same results in the analysis that follows.
15resulting social welfare is larger when the economy is relatively stable, i.e. when the
shocks’ variance is relatively small. Notice that the central government will take the risk
to (weakly) favor a region in an economy more unstable when the beneﬁt of re-election
is larger (the threshold e Y increases with the beneﬁt of re-election). Notice as well that
weak favoritism decreases with the size of externality, ε.
As I said above, I investigate whether favoritism makes room for Partial Decentral-
ization to provide the largest welfare. Proposition 1 shows the conditions in which Full
Centralization provides the largest welfare with no favoritism. How does the welfare
provided by Full Centralization is aﬀected by weak favoritism? Does it make room
for Partial Decentralization to provide the largest welfare? Formally, this is possible
only if e Y is larger than the thresholds Y 1, Y 2 and Y 3 in Proposition 1. The following
Proposition shows the conditions in which this is so (Proof in the Appendix),
Proposition 2 If the central government weakly favors one region, full centralization
provides the largest welfare if both the shock variability and the exogenous outside option
are large enough, as follows
1. if 1 + ε = 2p, Y > Y 1 and T > W
e Y .
2. if 1 + ε > 2p, Y > Y 2 and T >
4pW−(1+ε−2p)e Y 2
2(1+ε)e Y .
3. if 1 + ε < 2p, Y > Y 3 and T >
4pW+(2p−(1+ε))e Y 2
2(1+ε)e Y .
Partial decentralization never provides the largest welfare.
Full centralization with weak favoritism provides the largest welfare if the outside
option is above certain threshold. If T is interpreted as an exogenous minimum level of
welfare required by citizens, this Proposition says that the central government weakly
favors a region when citizens are very demanding. Regarding Case 3 (1 + ε < 2p),
Proposition 1 shows that T must be larger than
q
4pW(2p−(1+ε))
(1+ε)2 to make the central
government to provide the largest welfare. Proposition 2 shows that if T is too large,
the central government weakly favors a region.
Besides, weak favoritism does not make room for Partial Decentralization to provide
the largest welfare. With weak favoritism the central government is still accountable
to both regions in the sense that the central government maximizes the probability to
be reelected by at least one region. However, the central government cuts down the
cost by exerting eﬀort in a single region and aﬀects the other region’s welfare through
externalities. In Section 4.3 I make additional comments on how this result is aﬀected
by citizens’ risk aversion.
4.2 Strong Favoritism
Let me now consider the second type of favoritism. Strong favoritism is deﬁned as follows
16Deﬁnition 2 (Strong favoritism) The central government strongly favors region i if
maximizes the program Wpr(si) − C(a,b) over a1, b1, a2 and b2.
Strong favoritism is characterized by the fact that the central government maximizes
the probability to be re-elected by the favored region. Formally, the probability function
has changed. The central government only cares about the favored region’s welfare.
It exerts eﬀort in the non favored region to further increase the welfare in the favored
region. With strong favoritism the equilibrium eﬀorts in the favored and non favored































With strong favoritism, the central government behaves similarly to local govern-
ments. It coordinates policies across regions to maximize re-election by the favored one.
To show whether Partial Decentralization provides the largest welfare when the central
government strongly favors a region, I will ﬁrst present two Lemmas. In the ﬁrst one
I show the conditions in which the national politician prefers strong favoritism to no
favoritism. In the second one, I show the conditions in which Partial decentralization
provides larger welfare than Full centralization with strong favoritism.
Lemma 6 Let e Y ≡
q
2(1−ε)2W
(1+ε)2 , f(Y ) ≡
√
(1+ε)2Y 2((1+ε)2Y 4+8εWY 2−4(1−ε)2W 2)
2(1+ε)2Y 2 , T(Y ) ≡
W
Y − f(Y ) and T(Y ) ≡ W
Y + f(Y ).
The central government is better oﬀ strongly favoring one region than not favoring
anyone if
1. Y ≤ e Y
2. Y > e Y and T / ∈ (T(Y ),T(Y ))
Comparing Lemma 6 with Lemma 5, strong favoritism allows the central government
to favor a region in more unstable economies, that is, in economies in which the shock
variability is larger than e Y . This is so, if the outside option T is either large or small
enough. The thresholds T(Y ) and T(Y ) have two parts. From the proof of Lemma 6 in
the Appendix, if Y = e Y , T(Y ) = T(Y ) because f(e Y ) = 0. For Y > e Y , T(Y ) increases
with Y and T(Y ) decreases with Y since the derivative of f(Y ) with respect to Y is
positive. The larger the shock variance is, the harder strongly favor a region is. Let me
present the second Lemma (Proof in the Appendix),






















Partial decentralization provides larger welfare than full centralization with strong
favoritism when the shock variability is relatively large, as follows,
1. If 2p = 1 + ε, when Y > W
T .







and T > TP.
3. If 1 + ε < 2p, when Y > Y P
3 .
Partial Decentralization provides larger welfare than Full Centralization with strong
favoritism when the shock variance is large enough. To understand why, recall that with
strong favoritism the central government behaves like a local government. It is only
accountable to the favored region. Therefore, like the local government would do, the
central government exerts a big eﬀort when the economy is very stable. But equilibrium
eﬀorts decrease rapidly when the shock variance increases. Above the thresholds in
Lemma 7, partial decentralization does better. Governments free-ride each other, but
the losses in welfare due to free-riding are smaller than the losses in welfare due to strong
favoritism.
To show that Partial Decentralization provides the largest welfare when the central
government strongly favors one region, I restrict attention to the interval in which Y is
larger than e Y . It is suﬃcient to show four conditions to hold at the same time. First, that
under Full Centralization, the central government prefers strong favoritism over both no
favoritism and weak favoritism. Second, that the social welfare provided with strong
favoritism is lower than the social welfare provided with no favoritism. Third, that the
social welfare provided with Partial Decentralization is larger than the one provided with
Full Centralization. And fourth, that all this happens when Full Centralization with no
favoritism provides the largest welfare according to conditions in Proposition 1. With
these conditions, full centralization would provide the largest welfare when there is no
favoritism. However, the central government maximizes chances of re-election strongly
favoring one region. Social welfare is smaller with strong favoritism than with partial
decentralization. The following Proposition shows that Partial Decentralization provides
the largest welfare when both the shock variance and the outside option are large enough
(Proof in the Appendix),
Proposition 3 Partial decentralization provides the largest welfare when the central gov-
ernment chooses to strongly favor one region under the following conditions
1. 1 + ε = 2p. When Y > max{Y 1, e Y } and T > T(Y ).
2. 1 + ε > 2p. When Y ∈ (e Y ,Y
P
2 ) and T > max
n
TP,T(Y ), b T
o
.
183. 1 + ε < 2p. when Y > max{Y 3, e Y } and T > T(Y ).
where b T ≡
(1+ε−2p)
2(1+ε)
e Y + W
e Y . The other thresholds are deﬁned in Lemmas 2, 6 and 7.
Since T is very demanding, it is too costly for the central government to exert eﬀort
in both regions. Thus, it chooses to strongly favor one region. Partial decentralization
decreases the incentive for favoritism, cutting down the cost the central government must
aﬀord to exert eﬀort in both regions. Free-riding on the local governments is the cost to
make the central government to favor no region.
Given that Y > e Y , with Full Centralization the central government strongly favors
one region if T is either high or low enough according to Lemma 6. When T < T(Y ),
the social welfare provided with strong favoritism is larger than the one provided with
no favoritism. But, when T > T(Y ), the social welfare is smaller with strong favoritism
than with no favoritism. This explains why Partial Decentralization does better than
strong favoritism only if T > T(Y ).
Besides, notice that Case 2 (1+ε > 2p) is more demanding for Partial decentralization
than Case 3 (1 + ε < 2p). In Case 2, Y must belong to a bounded interval and T must
be larger than the maximum of three thresholds. None dominates the others. Indeed,
T(Y ) is increasing with Y and T(e Y ) = W
e Y . On the other hand, TP and b T do not vary
with Y but it is easy to see that when Y is low enough b T > T(Y ).
Case 2 is more demanding than the other cases because the rent scale eﬀect has an
oﬀsetting eﬀect on the reduced pivot probability eﬀect. To see this, assume the externality
coeﬃcient, ε, is given. On the one hand, if p is equal to one, the beneﬁt from re-
election is equal for both tiers of government and the rent scale eﬀect is zero. From my
assumptions, when p = 1, 1+ε < 2p. Decreasing p decreases the beneﬁt from re-election
for local governments vis-a-vis the central government. On the other hand, with Full
Centralization the citizens in either region have a lower probability to determine the
outcome of the election. This is the reduced pivot probability eﬀect. It allows the central
government to favor a region. Proposition 3 shows that the rent scale eﬀect does not
preclude the reduced pivot probability eﬀect. However, when the rent scale eﬀect is large
enough (1 + ε > 2p), the reduced pivot probability eﬀect is more limited, reducing the
case for Partial Decentralization.
The results of this Section for the case in which 1 + ε < 2p are depicted in Figure 1.
It shows which institutional setting provides the largest welfare in the space of the shock
variability Y (x-axis) against the outside option T (y-axis). I have assumed that e Y is
larger than the low-bar thresholds in Proposition 1. When the economy is very stable
(Y < Y 3), Full Decentralization provides the largest welfare (Proposition 1). When the
economy is relatively stable (Y 2 < Y < e Y )and T is low enough, Full Centralization with
no favoritism is the best for welfare. When T is large enough, the central government
has the incentive to weakly favor one region and weak favoritism does better for welfare
(Proposition 2). When the economy is more unstable (Y > e Y ), the central government
may have the incentive to strongly favor one region. This may happens if T is too high













Figure 1: Separable Tasks, Case 3
4.3 Risk Aversion
In the previous analysis I have assumed that citizens are risk neutral. They are indiﬀerent
between the lottery of being favored or not and the average welfare of both states. If
citizens are risk averse to favoritism, the social welfare with both types of favoritism will
decrease and the institutional setting that provides the largest welfare may change.
To illustrate the point assume that citizens are inﬁnitely risk averse. Hence, the social
welfare is given by the lowest welfare provided by either region at the equilibrium. With
full decentralization, partial decentralization and full centralization with no favoritism,
the social welfare is the same as before. With weak favoritism the social welfare becomes
equal to the social welfare in the non favored region,
ε(1+ε)(2T+Y )W
(1+ε)2Y 2+4εW . The ﬁrst part of
Lemma 5 still holds, i.e., the central government is better oﬀ weakly favoring one region
if Y < e Y . But the Social Welfare is no longer larger with weak favoritism than with no
favoritism. Indeed, social welfare is larger with no favoritism (equation 14) than with
weak favoritism for all Y . Under conditions in Proposition 2, Partial Decentralization
would provide the largest welfare.
With strong favoritism the social welfare becomes equal to εW
(1+ε)Y . The central
government is still better oﬀ with strong favoritism according to conditions in Lemma
6. However, strong favoritism does not provide the largest welfare when Y > e Y and
T < T(Y ). This increases the case for Partial decentralization to provide the largest
welfare. Although I have considered an extreme case, it illustrates very well the idea
that risk aversion to favoritism increases room for the case of Partial Decentralization.
205 Non Separable Tasks
In this section I turn to the case in which kL = kC = kPD = k. I want to know how
the results of the previous section are aﬀected by task substitution. When tasks are
substitutes (i.e. k > 0), tasks are more costly for politicians. An additional unit of eﬀort
in one task increases the marginal cost of eﬀort in the other. On the contrary, when
tasks are complements (i.e. k < 0), an additional unit of eﬀort in one task decreases the
marginal cost of eﬀort in the other.
5.1 Full Decentralization and Full Centralization
The local governments choose eﬀorts to maximize equation (8) with the cost function
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. (22)
















(2T + Y )W
2((1 + k)Y 2 + 2W)
, for i = 1,2. (23)







2((1+k)(1+ε)2Y 2+4εW) and with strong favoritism the equilibrium eﬀorts in the












Proposition 4 (Proof in the Appendix) With full decentralization and full centraliza-
tion, increasing (decreasing) task substitution always decreases (increases) the equilib-
rium eﬀort of politicians.
Since tasks are more costly for politicians when tasks are substitutes, the politicians
reduce their equilibrium eﬀorts compared to those with no substitution. In contrast,
when tasks are complements, they are less costly, and politicians increase their equilib-
rium eﬀorts compared to those with no substitution. With Full Decentralization, local
governments reduce (increase) free-riding when the tasks are substitutes (complements).
With both types of favoritism, the central government uses externalities to further re-
duce eﬀort when tasks are substitutes and to further increase eﬀort when tasks are
complements.
215.2 Partial Decentralization
With Partial Decentralization the local government of region i faces a cost function
equal to Ci (ai) =
a2
i
















Tasks as strategic substitutes if k > 0 and strategic complements if k < 0. When
tasks are substitutes, local governments free-ride on the central government’s eﬀort,
reducing eﬀort in k units for each unit of the central government’s eﬀort. When tasks
are complements, local governments increase eﬀort in k units for each unit of central
government’s eﬀort.
Taking the symmetric solution (a1 = a2, b1 = b2), the optimal behavior of the central













Tasks are strategic substitutes for the central government even for some negative
values of k. Tasks are strategic complements for the central government only when
k < − W
Y 2. The equilibrium eﬀorts are
aPD
i =
W(2p(W + Y 2) − (1 + ε)kY (2T + Y ))





W((1 + ε)Y (2T + Y ) − 2p(W + kY 2))
2(1 + ε)(1 − k)Y (W + (1 + k)Y 2)
(27)
Equations (26) and (27) show that the task substitution coeﬃcient has two contrary
eﬀects on eﬀorts. On the one hand, increasing task substitution reduces the equilibrium
eﬀorts because it makes eﬀorts more costly at the margin. On the other hand, increasing
task substitution increases the equilibrium eﬀorts because each government increases
eﬀorts to compensate the reduction of the other government’s eﬀort.





2(1+ε) Y . This is not possible under the conditions on T in Proposition
3. Therefore, when the partial decentralization provides the largest welfare, the central
government provides a positive eﬀort.
225.3 Institutional Comparisons
Task substitution aﬀects the social welfare provided by the diﬀerent institutional settings.
Comparing full decentralization with full centralization (Proof in the Appendix),
Proposition 5 Increasing (decreasing) task substitution increases (decreases) the case
for full centralization with no favoritism vis-a-vis full decentralization.
When the central government favors no region, full centralization is better than full
decentralization to deal with task substitution. This is so because the central govern-
ment can coordinate policies across regions in order to reduce eﬀort. Indeed, when the
central government weakly favors one region, it is not clear any more if increasing task
substitution increases weak favoritism. Recall that weak favoritism provides the largest
welfare in the intervals deﬁned between the low-bar thresholds (Y 1, Y 2, Y 3) and e Y .
The low-bar thresholds are decreasing in k (see Proof of Proposition 5). On the other
hand, e Y becomes equal to
r
2(1−ε)2W
(1+ε)2(1+k). Both thresholds are thus decreasing in k. It
is not clear what is the net eﬀect on the interval of shock variability. Increasing tasks
substitution makes full centralization to be better than full decentralization in providing
welfare in more stable economies. However, it also increases the cost of not coordinating
externalities across regions, that is, the cost of weakly favoring a region.
The following Proposition shows the eﬀect of task substitution on partial decentral-
ization (Proof in the Appendix),
Proposition 6 Increasing task substitution makes partial decentralization to provide the
largest welfare in more stable economies. It also reduces the constraint on the exogenous
outside option in those economies.
The Proposition is depicted in Figure 2. The central government becomes able to
strongly favor one region in more stable economies. This is so because it uses the
externalities the favored region is recipient of to reduce the extra-cost brought about by
task substitution. As before partial decentralization does better than strong favoritism
according to conditions in Proposition 3. However, only is possible to say something
with respect to the more stable economies of the interval (i.e. for Y near e Y ) due to the
constraints on T. Indeed, T(Y ) is increasing in Y , so that increasing task substitution
makes the minimum T more demanding for Y high enough.
6 Conclusions
This paper addresses the issue of the appropriate level of decentralization of a multi-
task government. In the setting developed above, citizens provide incentives to politi-
cians through re-election. The basic trade-oﬀ is between coordination of externalities
across regions (which favors assigning tasks to the central government) and account-












Figure 2: Partial Decentralization and increasing task substitution
compared three forms of government: full centralization, full decentralization and par-
tial decentralization. I fully characterized which form of government provides the largest
welfare depending on the stability of the economy, given by the variance of regional
shocks, and the exogenous outside option that citizens require to re-elect politicians.
The paper shows that full decentralization provides the largest welfare in more stable
economies and that full centralization does so in more unstable economies. Besides, the
central government favors one region while being accountable to both regions (weak
favoritism) if the economy is relatively stable and the exogenous outside option is high.
The central government favors one region while being accountable to a single region
(strong favoritism) if the economy is relatively unstable and the exogenous outside option
is either high or low enough.
Moreover, I ﬁnd that partial decentralization provides the largest social welfare when
the central government strongly favors a region. Partial decentralization reduces the cen-
tral government’ incentives to shirk while taking advantage from the larger accountability
of local governments. Central government’s free-riding on local governments’ eﬀorts is
the cost of precluding favoritism. The result extents to weak favoritism, at least in part,
when citizens are risk averse to favoritism.
The paper also sheds light on how task substitution aﬀects the provision of social
welfare. The central government is better than local governments to deal with task
substitution. More precisely, increasing task substitution makes the case for full cen-
tralization in more stable economies. In addition, increasing tasks substitution makes
likely for the central government to strongly favor one region in economies relatively
more stable, which increases the case for partial decentralization.
24These results seem to be in line with the empirical ﬁndingsin Barankay and Lockwood
(2007). Using Swiss data, the authors show that expenditure decentralization increases
educational attaintment. Indeed, expenditure decentralization is strongly associated
to the assignment of both teachers appointment and teachers incentive pay to local
governments. However, it is not associated to the local power on determining teacher
salaries nor structural school organization. It appears that the assignment of the diﬀerent
tasks of educational policy is related to the productive eﬃciency of government.
Some extensions to the model would cast additional results. Citizens may estimate
the performance of politicians and take into account this estimation in order to re-elect or
not the incumbent. A way to do so is making T endogenous. In addition, other sources of
favoritism are noteworthy. Correlation between shocks seems to be important. If shocks
are positively correlated both central and local governments are more likely to reduce
eﬀorts, aﬀecting the probability of favoring one region. However, in that case citizens
may use yardstick competition to decide whether to re-elect the incumbent. These and
other interesting extensions are left for future research.
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W(2W+Y 2)−2Y W(2T+Y )
2(Y 2+2W)
2 .
This derivative is positive if W
￿
2W + Y 2￿
> 2Y W(2T + Y ) and negative if the
inequality goes in the other sense. Rearranging terms the derivative is positive if Y 2 +
4TY − 2W < 0. The single positive root of this quadratic expression is Y = −2T +
√
4T2 + 2W. If Y < −2T +
√
4T2 + 2W then
∂aC
i
∂Y > 0. If Y > −2T +
√









Y 2+2W . Manipulating this inequality, it holds when
(1 + ε − 2p)Y 2 + 2T(1 + ε)Y − 4pW < 0 (28)
If 1 + ε = 2p, then inequality holds if Y <
2pW
T(1+ε).






















Proof of Lemma 3 This proof follows the same steps of the proof of Lemma




Y 2+2W . Manipulating this inequality, it holds when
Y [(1 + ε − 2p)Y 2 + 2T(1 + ε)Y − 4pW] < 0. (29)
The expression in squared brackets is equal to Equation (28). The rest of the proof
is equal to proof of Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 4 It follows the same steps of proofs of Lemmas 2 and 3. Taking
equations (15) and equation (16), welfare with full decentralization is larger than wel-




2(1+ε)(Y 2+W) . Manipulating this
inequality, it holds when inequality in Equation (28) holds. The rest of the proof is equal
to that of Lemma 2.
27Proof of Proposition 1 The proof readily follows from the previous Lemmas.
If 1+ε = 2p, full decentralization provides larger welfare than the other regimes when
Y <
2pW
T(1+ε) (Condition 1 in Lemmas 2 and 4). When Y <
2pW
T(1+ε), full centralization
provides larger welfare than the other regimes (Condition 1 in Lemmas 2 and 3).










1+ε−2p , full centralization provides larger welfare than the
other regimes (Condition 2 in Lemmas 2 and 3).





2p−(1+ε) . These roots do not exist if (1+ε)2T2 < 4pW(2p−
(1 + ε)). Since 1 + ε < 2p equation (28) can be rewritten as
(2p − (1 + ε))Y 2 − 2T(1 + ε)Y + 4pW > 0 (30)
This quadratic form is always positive if (1 + ε)2T2 < 4pW(2p − (1 + ε)). Therefore, if
1+ε < 2p and (1+ε)2T2 < 4pW(2p−(1+ε)) hold, full decentralization always provides
the largest welfare.
If (1+ε)2T2 > 4pW(2p−(1+ε)), the real roots exist and full decentralization gener-









2p−(1+ε) (Condition 3 in Lemmas 2 and 4). Full centraliza-









2p−(1+ε) (Condition 3 in Lemmas 2 and 3).
Finally, from Lemmas 3 and 4, if all the previous conditions on Y are veriﬁed with
equality, welfare under partial decentralization is equal to welfare with the other settings.
As I have shown, otherwise, it is always lower.
Proof of Lemma 5 To prove the ﬁrst part it is enough to compare the indirect
utility of the central government with no favoritism and weak favoritism. Let V C and
V Cwf the politician’s indirect utility with no favoritism and weak favoritism, respectively.
I need to prove that if Y 2 <
2(1−ε)2W
(1+ε)2 then V Cwf > V C.
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over a1, b1, a2 and b2.
28With weak favoritism the problem of the central government is to maximize Equation
(31) over ai, bi subject to aj = bj = 0.
Replacing equilibrium eﬀorts from Equation (7) in Equation (31), I obtain, after
some simpliﬁcations,
V C =
W(−4T2 + 8W − 4TY + 3Y 2)
4(2W + Y 2)
(32)
Similarly, replacing equilibrium eﬀorts from Equation (17) in Equation (31), I obtain,
V Cwf =
W
4Y 2[(1 + ε)2Y 2 + 4εW]
×
[(−4T2 − 4TY + 3Y 2)((1 + ε)2Y 2 − (1 − ε)2W)
+ 16εWY 2 + 4(1 − ε)2WY 2]
(33)
Rearranging terms and after some simpliﬁcations V Cwf > V C if [2(1 − ε)2W − (1 +
ε)2Y 2][4T2 + 4TY + Y 2] > 0.
The second term in squared brackets is always positive. If Y 2 <
2(1−ε)2W
(1+ε)2 , the ﬁrst
term in squared brackets is positive and, therefore, V Cwf > V C.
To prove the second part, let us compare the welfare. With no favoritism, the central









W (2T + Y )
Y 2 + 2W
(34)











(1 + ε)2(2T + Y )W
2((1 + ε)2Y 2 + 4εW)
(35)
Welfare with weak favoritism is larger than welfare with no favoritism if (1+ε)2(Y 2+
2W) > 2((1 + ε)2Y 2 + 4εW). The latter inequality holds if Y 2 <
2(1−ε)2W
(1+ε)2 .
Proof of Proposition 2 To prove this Proposition, I need to show three conditions
to hold at the same time: ﬁrst, that the central government is better oﬀ favoring a region;
second, that it provides larger social welfare favoring a region than not doing so; and
third, that it provides larger social welfare than the other institutional settings. Lemma
5 shows that if Y 2 < e Y 2 ≡
2(1−ε)2W
(1+ε)2 , the ﬁrst two conditions above hold.
Let us proceed with the last condition. From Proposition 1 and Lemma 2, full
centralization provides the largest welfare (with no favoritism), as follows,
1. If 1 + ε = 2p, when Y > Y 1.
2. If 1 + ε > 2p, when Y > Y 2.
293. If 1 + ε < 2p and T2 >
4pW(2p−(1+ε))
(1+ε)2 , when Y 3 < Y < Y 3.
I need to show which conditions make the threshold e Y to belong to these intervals.
• Case 1: 1 + ε = 2p. The central government with weak favoritism provides the
largest welfare if
2pW
T(1+ε) < e Y . It holds if T > W
e Y .






(1+ε−2p) < e Y .
Rearranging gives
q
T2 (1 + ε)
2 + 4pW (1 + ε − 2p) < (1 + ε − 2p) e Y + T (1 + ε).
This inequality holds if T >
4pW−(1+ε−2p)e Y 2
2(1+ε)e Y .
• Case 3: 1 + ε < 2p and T2 >
4pW(2p−(1+ε))
(1+ε)2 . Let e T ≡
q
4pW(2p−(1+ε))
(1+ε)2 . The central









The ﬁrst inequality holds if
(1 + ε)T − (2p − (1 + ε)) e Y <
q
(1 + ε)
2 T2 − 4pW (2p − (1 + ε))
Taking squares, simplifying and isolating T, it boils down to T >
(2p−(1+ε))e Y 2+4pW
2(1+ε)e Y ≡





. Since T > T
′
, both conditions hold when T > T.






2 . Taking squares,
simplifying and rearranging terms the inequality becomes
(1 + ε)
4 p2 + 4(1 − ε)
4 (2p − (1 + ε))
2 + 2(1 + ε)
2 (1 − ε)
2 p[2p − (1 + ε)] > 0
Since 2p > 1 + ε the expression is positive and T > e T.
Proof of Lemma 6 Let e Y ≡
q
2(1−ε)2W
(1+ε)2 , f(Y ) ≡
√
(1+ε)2Y 2((1+ε)2Y 4+8εWY 2−4(1−ε)2W 2)
2(1+ε)2Y 2 ,
T(Y ) ≡ W
Y −f(Y ) and T(Y ) ≡ W




2(1+ε)2Y 2 . With no favoritism is V C =
W(8W+3Y 2−4T2−4TY)
4(2W+Y 2) .
Utility from strong favoritism is larger than utility from no favoritism if
304(1 + ε)
2 Y 2T2 − 8(1 + ε)
2 WY T + 8
￿
1 + ε2￿
W2 − 8εWY 2 − (1 + ε)
2 Y 4 > 0. This
expression is a quadratic form of T, whose real roots are given by T(Y ),T(Y ) = W
Y ±
f (Y ).
Examining f(Y ) there are three cases. If (1 + ε)
2 Y 4 + 8εWY 2 − 4(1 − ε)
2 W2 < 0,
there are no real roots and strong favoritism is better than no favoritism for all T.
If (1 + ε)
2 Y 4 + 8εWY 2 − 4(1 − ε)
2 W2 = 0, T(Y ) = T(Y ) = W
Y . Therefore, strong
favoritism is at least a good as no favoritism to the politician.
If (1 + ε)
2 Y 4 + 8εWY 2 − 4(1 − ε)
2 W2 > 0, there are two diﬀerent real roots.
Notice that (1 + ε)
2 Y 4 + 8εWY 2 − 4(1 − ε)














2 . The last expres-
sion is the square of e Y .
Therefore, reexpressing in terms of e Y : if Y < e Y , V Csf > V C; if Y = e Y , V Csf ≥ V C
(with V Csf = V C when T = W
Y ); and if Y > e Y ,V Csf > V C when T / ∈
￿
T (Y ),T (Y )
￿
.















Considering the cases of Lemma2,
• 2p = 1+ε. Welfare with partial decentralization is larger than welfare with strong
favoritism if Y > W
T .
• 1+ε > 2p. Welfare with partial decentralization is larger than welfare with strong
favoritism if (1 + ε − 2p)Y 2 −2(1 + ε)TY +2(1 + ε)W < 0. This expression has


















partial decentralization is better to
social welfare.
• (1 + ε) < 2p. Welfare with partial decentralization is larger if (2p − (1 + ε))Y 2 +






2p−(1+ε) . If Y > Y P
3 the equation is positive.
Proof of Proposition 3
Partial decentralization provides the largest welfare if,
1. The central government is better oﬀ strongly favoring one region, V Csf > V C and
V Csf > V Cwf.
























4. Full decentralization provides less welfare than full centralization (Lemma 2).
I restrict attention to the case in which Y > e Y . Therefore if V Csf > V C, V Csf >
V Cwf. Condition 2 holds if W
Y <
W(2T+Y )





Considering the cases of Lemma2,
• 1 + ε = 2p. From Lemma 7, conditions 2 and 3 hold when inequality in Equation
(36) is veriﬁed. From Lemma 6, if Y > W
T and Y > e Y conditions 2 and 3 hold if
T > T (Y ). Since Y 1 may be smaller or larger than e Y , conditions 1−4 hold when
Y > max{Y 1, e Y }.







. Since Y > e Y , it







. A suﬃcient condition for both e Y > Y P









e Y + W
e Y ≡ b T. Since 1 + ε > 2p, this inequality
implies equation (36) when Y is not large. Since T must be larger than W
Y , T
cannot be smaller than T(Y ) = W
Y − f (Y ) and, therefore, T must be larger than
T(Y ) = W
Y +f (Y ). Finally, b T and TP are larger than T(Y ) for Y near to e Y . The
opposite is true for larger Y . Therefore T must be larger than max
n
T(Y ),T P, b T
o
.
• (1 + ε) < 2p. From Lemma7, condition 3 holds if Y > Y P
3 . Since Y > e Y then
either e Y > Y P
3 or Y P
3 > e Y . Taking the deﬁnitions in Lemmas 5 and 7, Y P
3 < e Y
if T >
2(1+ε)W−(2p−(1+ε))e Y 2
2(1+ε)e Y and Y P
3 > e Y if T <
2(1+ε)W−(2p−(1+ε))e Y 2
2(1+ε)e Y . Since
1 + ε < 2p, Y P




e Y , which contradicts Y > e Y
and Y > W
T . Therefore e Y must be larger than Y P
3 . Indeed, since 2p > 1 + ε,
T > W









equation (36), T must be larger than W
Y . Therefore, partial decentralization is
better if T > T(Y ).
32Proof of Proposition 4












(1+ε)Y (1+k)2 < 0.
































































Y (1+ε)(1+k)2 < 0.
Proof of Proposition 5
From proposition (1), the case for full centralization with no favoritism increases if
Y 1,Y 2,Y 3 decrease and Y 3 increases. When kL = kL = k, welfare becomes
2pW
(1+ε)(1+k)Y
with full decentralization and
W(2T+Y )
2W+(1+k)Y 2 with full centralization.
Full decentralization provides larger welfare than full centralization if
(1 + k)(1 + ε − 2p)Y 2 + 2(1 + ε)(1 + k)TY − 4pW < 0.
1. If 1 + ε = 2p , Y 1 ≡ W











1+ε−2p . Let C = (1 + ε)
2 T2 +
4pW(1+ε−2p)




























Proof of Proposition 6
From Proposition (3), Partial Decentralization provides the largest welfare above
some thresholds in the shock variability and the exogenous outside option. To prove the
ﬁrst part of this proposition I need to show that the threshold for the shock variability
decreases when k increases. From proposition (3), the thresholds are: 1. max
n
Y 1, e Y
o
if 1 + ε = 2p; 2. e Y if 1 + ε > 2p; 3. max
n
Y 3, e Y
o
if 1 + ε < 2p.
When k  = 0, these thresholds become e Y =
r
2(1−ε)2W
(1+ε)2(1+k), Y 1 = W












∂k = − W
































(1+k)2 > 0 , where D ≡ (1 + ε)
2 T2 −
2(1+ε−2p)(1+ε)W







To prove the second part of the proposition I need to show that the threshold for the
outside option decreases when both k increases and Y > e Y is small enough. From Propo-
sition (3), the minimum T required is T (Y ) if (1 + ε) ≤ 2p and max
n
TP,T (Y ), b T
o
if
1+ε > 2p. When k  = 0 these thresholds become T (Y ) = W
Y (1+k)









2(1+ε)2Y 2 ; Tp =
q
2(1+ε−2p)W
(1+ε)(1+k) and b T =
(1+ε−2p)
2(1+ε)
e Y + W
(1+k)e Y ,




Deriving T with respect to k,
∂T(Y )
∂k = − W
























∂k = − W
e Y (1+k)2 < 0. Besides, notice that
∂f(Y )






∂k < 0 if Y > Y ∗. Since
∂T(Y )
∂k is continuous, it is negative for Y near to e Y and
becomes positive at some level of Y . Therefore if 1+ε ≤ 2p, an increase in k will reduce
T (Y ) for Y > e Y small enough.






0, where F ≡
2(1+ε−2p)W






2(1+k)2e Y . Since ∂e Y
∂k < 0 then ∂ b T
∂k < 0.
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